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The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG 2) contains a
global commitment to “end hunger, achieve food security, and promote
sustainable agriculture” by 2030. The realization of this goal under the
current global political economy, climate change trends, and national
realities is a daunting challenge. In this article, we draw on political
ecology theory to examine the complex ecological, economic, geopolitical,
climatic, and socially-induced barriers that threaten the achievement of
SDG 2 in two oil producing countries with a high dependency on food
imports: Qatar and Nigeria. First, we provide an overview of barriers to
global food security and sustainable agriculture by discussing how the
unevenness of power and resource distribution, reduced genetic diversity,
land grabs, restrictive property rights, and the control of stable food
production by big agri-businesses, all served to undermine hunger
reduction and food security in the last 20 years. Second, drawing on
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newspaper analysis and an extensive literature review, we answer the
questions: what are the current and future barriers to food security in
Qatar and Nigeria? What efforts are these countries taking to address
these barriers? What can both countries learn from one another? We
also identify opportunities for new governance architecture on local food
production. Finally, we suggest ways in which crucial reforms at local,
national, regional and global scales might allow these countries to
progressively realize SDG 2 by 2030 even under a climate change scenario.
Keywords: Food Security; Import Dependency; Land Grab; Political
Ecology; Property Rights; Sustainable Development Goals; Nigeria; Qatar.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Food is necessary for life and plays an important role in disease prevention,
social functioning, and learning capacity, among other social, cultural
and health benefits.1 Food security gained global recognition during the
1974 World Food Conference where governments proclaimed that “every
man, woman, and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger
and malnutrition in order to develop their physical and mental faculties”.2
This conference laid the groundwork for the World Food Summit of 1996
where global commitment was renewed at the highest political level,
stating that food security “exists when all people, at all times, have physical
and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.3
Furthermore, the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights declared the “fundamental right of everyone to be free
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from hunger” and acknowledged the need for international cooperation
to eliminate hunger.4 These international recognitions accurately
summarize the importance of food as the bedrock of life and the core
reason why agriculture remains one of the most fundamental determinants
of a country’s overall sustainable development.
The Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG 2) contains a global
commitment to “end hunger, achieve food security, and promote
sustainable agriculture” by 2030. SDG 2 seeks sustainable solutions to
achieving the tripod criteria of food security (i.e. availability, affordability,
and accessibility) as a means to end hunger. Although the fight against
hunger has progressed over the last decade, food security remains a
distant aspiration globally. According to the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), more than 815 million people worldwide, i.e. one
in nine people on earth, do not have enough food to meet their basic
nutritional needs.5 Currently, Asia is the continent with the largest number
of hungry people at 512 million, while Africa is second with 233 million
hungry, poor and malnourished people.6 The United Nations International
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) also estimated that 300 million
children go to bed hungry and 8000 children under the age of five die of
malnutrition every day, with reported cases of malnutrition and hunger
even in the developed countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada
and the United States.7 Only 38 out 189 countries met the Millennium
Development Goal (MDG) 1 targets for zero hunger.8 SDG 2, therefore,
represents an unfinished business from MDG 1.
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In this article, we argue that food insecurity is associated with and
embedded in the social relations of production and power dynamics
among and within countries. Food insecurity, therefore, cannot be
addressed in an effective and sustained manner without proper
interrogation of how food shortages and food crises are socially produced
at multiple scales – especially how recent revolutions in law, regulatory
policies, rights, and trade have accelerated the commodification of
natural resources required to produce food, i.e., land, seed, air and water.
Questions about hunger and food security are not different from questions
about power and market economics, that is, who has power over land?
Who controls seeds? Who has the capacity to respond to changes in
climatic conditions and market prices? Who controls agricultural systems?
How is power over food and agricultural systems legitimized through
power structures and global market forces that create a perpetual system
of winners and losers? These questions remain salient as the world
calculates the gains and losses from the MDGs, but also looks forward to
meeting the SDGs. Using Nigeria and Qatar as case studies, we explore
some of these problems and other barriers that might undermine the
progressive realization of SDG 2 in both countries.
Following this introduction, we provide an overview of SDG 2 and
contextualize it within a political ecology and theoretical framework.
We show that food is embedded in the broader political economy and
central to the understanding of political ecologies of land relations,
agrarian change, and environmental norms and practices in the vast
majority of societies in the world. To this effect, we argue that new
global goals such as SDG 2 are unlikely to produce sustainable socio-
environmental futures to the extent that they fail to account for problems
in the global political economy, national and regional differences, and
local transformations that affect the drivers and underlying root causes
of food insecurity. After the theory section, we briefly discuss lessons
learnt in the last fifteen years and identify the transformation required
on a global scale moving forward. In the subsequent section, we focus
on our case studies of food security challenges in Nigeria and Qatar. We
discuss the peculiar barriers that each country faces, their strategies for
overcoming these barriers, and other reforms required to facilitate the
progressive implementation of SDG 2. We conclude this article with
recommendations to governments and policy makers on the transformation
and synergy required to ensure sustained results on SDG 2 targets in
developing and emerging economies.
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2.  SDG 2 AND POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF
GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the SDGs in September
2015 to replace the previously established Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) (2000-2015). The SDGs are far more expansive than the MDGs.
There are 17 SDGs with 169 targets, covering a broad range of sustainable
development issues, including poverty eradication, reduced inequality,
clean water and sanitation, clean energy, climate action, and so on.
SDG 2 specifically contains significant and ambitious commitments to
ensure that everyone everywhere has enough good quality food to lead a
healthy life.9 Its ultimate aim is to end hunger and all forms of
malnutrition by the year 2030 through sustainable food production
systems and resilient agricultural practices. In this article, we argue that
a politicized understanding of food security and agricultural systems is
a first step in an emancipatory effort to challenge the current status quo
as a way to change it. To do this, we use political ecology theory to
examine the architecture of global food insecurity and its implications
for poor countries and communities.
Political ecology is defined as the combination of ecological concerns
and a broadly defined political economy. It emerged in the 1970s as a
critique of the apolitical understanding of the relationship between food,
famine, environmental change, and land degradation.10 Studies in this
area have used a Marxist historical perspective to critically examine how
food insecurity and famine are socially produced through the incorporation
of agrarian communities into the global capitalist economy, particularly
exploring the role of the state in supporting accumulation by dominant
classes – both local and transnational.11 While acknowledging
environmental constraints, political ecologists have rejected the
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Malthusian narrative of resource scarcity as the underlining cause of
food insecurity. Instead, scarcity is seen as a result of inequalities produced
through systems of food governance, markets, and distribution.12 For
example, Sen (1981) showed that the 1943 West Bengal famine was
caused by well-functioning markets, not drought or absolute shortage in
food supplies. More recently, scarcity discourses have attempted to
naturalize existing inequalities and have been used by neoliberal
proponents to enter into fragile markets for the purpose of capital
accumulation. Political ecologists, drawing on chains of explanation
and scalar analysis, have therefore dismissed mainstream accounts that
blame local people or non-human actors (such as drought, floods, and
climatic conditions) as the root cause of food insecurity.13 Rather, focus
is shifted to how land and resource use decisions are shaped by political
and economic forces that operate at scales that transcend the local level.14
For example, climate change, which has become an important factor in
food production, has roots in industrial revolution and well-functioning
capitalist markets that have contributed to transforming the global
environment in radical ways with severe implications for sustainable
agriculture both in developed and developing countries.
In analysing modern agriculture and food systems in developing
regions, a number of scholars have shown that a variety of factors drive
food security, including neoliberal policies and the effects of deregulation;
the weakening power of government institutions; the growing influence
of corporate power; class and gender relations in agriculture; ecological
conditions and consequences of different forms of agricultural practices.
Also important is the complex restructuring of trade relations including
new forms of valuation and commodification of nature and their profound
implications in terms of who is able to produce food, who is able to
access food, and who is able to choose what they eat and how much
they eat.15 Viewed from this perspective, achieving global and national
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food security as well as sustainable agriculture thus becomes a mosaic
of power structures, economic relations, land use, property rights, and
ecological transformations involving different methods of commandeering
the natural environment, normative visions of development, and valuation
systems about food. In this article, we argue that global goal setting,
while important, also obscures the social processes through which food
security or insecurity is produced. To gain a holistic understanding of
the challenges ahead in realizing SDG 2, attention, therefore, must be
given to global, regional and national political economy forces, including
issues of uneven power relations among and within states, changes in
climatic conditions, disturbance of local ecologies, social relations of
power, as well as interactions and influences of the global food market
and price mechanisms.
In the subsequent section, we provide an overview of lessons learned
in the last 20 years. We also discuss the need to avoid a similar pitfall in
the 15 years dedicated to achieving SDG 2.
3. WHAT WE HAVE LEARNT ON A GLOBAL SCALE
IN THE LAST 20 YEARS
When the MDGs ended in 2015, it received commendation for reducing
extreme poverty and hunger rates. The United Nations reported a 50 per
cent reduction in the number of people living in extreme poverty and
hunger. In developing regions, the proportion of people living on less
than US$1.25 a day fell from 47 per cent to 22 per cent by 2010, and the
proportion of undernourished people globally decreased from 23.2 per
cent in 1990 to 14.9 per cent in 2012 (United Nations, 2015). Critics,
however, expressed that progress on hunger reduction was less than it
appeared.16 Global rates masked uneven regional and national progress
in reducing hunger. China’s successful poverty reduction strategy, for
example, accounted for most of the world’s gain over the last 25 years.17
Extreme poverty rates in East Asia, which dropped from 61 per cent in
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1990 to 4 per cent in 2015, were also part of the gains. In contrast, 40
per cent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa remained in extreme
poverty with millions of people unable to afford a daily meal.18
A major concern within the last 20 years was the strategic move to
impose genetically modified (GM) seeds on variety of countries desperate
for food. These seeds are owned by transnational agri-businesses seeking
new markets for surplus extraction. Some scholars have argued that the
move to GM seeds is necessary to address global food insecurity because
of increased population growth and the need to respond to climate
change.19 As a result, biotechnology-market solutions backed by
Malthusian narratives are being used to validate and legitimize the
production of GM corns and soybeans as the main staple to feed the
world’s population. This has led to major restructuring in seed ownership
and increased monopoly of seed markets by agri-businesses such as
Monsanto, Dupont, and Sygenta. For example, Monsanto controls 80
per cent of GM corn market, 93 per cent of GM soybeans market, and
over 282 million acres of land worldwide are being used to grow GM
products.20 Such levels of concentration of corn and soybeans in the
hands of big businesses has led to reduced genetic diversity, fewer choices
for farmers, and skyrocketing prices regardless of whether farmers choose
to grow GM or organic (Non-GM) seeds.21
Furthermore, the question of who owns, has legitimate rights over,
and controls or uses seeds is important when thinking about SDG 2. In
the last decade, transnational agri-businesses have gained greater control
over global seeds and indigenous people’s knowledge through new
property rights protected by Patent Laws and the Trade-Related Intellectual
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Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of the World Trade Organization.22
Seed, once a common property, is now transformed through bio-technology
and global intellectual property and patent laws into a private commodity
to enhance surplus extraction from some of the most vulnerable regions
of the world. This form of appropriation implies new valuation systems
and transfer of ownership of resources (that were once public or not
even subject to ownership) into the hands of the powerful.23 For Shiva
(2016), “patents on seeds is a patent on life”, by adding one new gene to
the cell of a plant, corporations lay claim to the invention of a new seed,
a new plant, and all future seeds, as their private property conferring
exclusive rights to the owners.24 Not only are seed patents extremely
expensive but those that profit the most are the transnational agri-
businesses. For example, between 2004 and 2008, Monsanto and Dupont
accounted for 60 per cent of patent applications.25 By 2007, Monsanto
owned 23 per cent of global proprietary seed market; Dupont owned 15
per cent; and Syngenta 9 per cent.26 Since then, new mergers and
acquisitions of the seed market have occurred, and the number of patents
owned by these companies has increased, thus concentrating seed
ownership in the hands of capital. David Harvey describes such economic
re-structuring as “accumulation by dispossession”27 – where smallholder
farmers are now forced to purchase seed from the “new owners”. This
process of accumulation underlies global food insecurity and
unsustainable agricultural practices. Patents of seeds impoverish human
society ethically, economically, and ecologically. They deserve further
interrogation under the SDG 2, especially if the least developed countries
are to achieve food security by 2030.
Other problems that emerged in last 20 years included land grabbing,
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food price volatility, geopolitical conflicts, increases in extreme weather
events, decreases in soil fertility, and food justice issues on multiple
scales. We discuss some of these concerns in our case study of Nigeria
and Qatar and argue that SDG 2 presents a possibility of conceiving food
security in radically different ways that ensures equity and justice in
production, availability and access.
4.  COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF FOOD SECURITY
AND SDG 2
To give an illustration of the existing and new challenges developing
countries face in achieving food security and meeting SDG 2, we focus
on two case studies: Nigeria and Qatar. We draw on an extensive literature
review and newspaper analysis in Nigeria and Qatar. Both countries were
selected based on their similarities and peculiar struggles with food
security. Both countries have a history of a sluggish agricultural sector;
they run oil and gas-based economies; they are members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); they rely heavily
on food imports; and are predicted to experience severe climate change
impacts. However, there are differences in terms of population, GDP,
natural resources, water availability, climate, and forest cover.
4.1 Food Security in Nigeria
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with about 190.9 million
people.28 It has a total land mass of 923,763km2 and is diverse both
culturally and geographically with a wide range of natural resources.
About 60 per cent of the land in the country (74 million hectares) is
arable with variations between the North and South. In the early 1950s,
Nigeria fed its population and was a major exporter of food.29 However,
the discovery of oil and the military takeover in the 1970s led to decreased
investment in agriculture and greater dependency on oil revenue that
would continue for several years. Riding on the accruing petrodollars,
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Nigeria’s economy has grown in the last five decades. Its Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is US$375.8 billion and Gross National Income (GNI) per
capita is US$5,700.30 However, the country struggles to meet the basic
needs of its citizens. Nigeria also ranks low on the UN Human
Development Index at 157 out of 189 countries; and the proportion of
working people who live on less than US$3 a day is 71.7 per cent.31
During the MDG timeline, Nigeria did not significantly reduce poverty
but made progress in the fight against hunger. It reduced hunger by 66
per cent and also reduced the proportion of underweight children from
35.7 per cent in 1990 to 25.5 per cent in 2013.32 This progress was
achieved through a combination of institutional and policy interventions
such as the Agriculture Transformation Agenda (ATA) implemented by
the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, the National Poverty Eradication
Programme (NAPEP) and several other development partners.33
Recent data shows Nigeria has not been able to maintain success on
hunger reduction. In 2017, the country fared poorly on the Global Hunger
Index34 with a composite score of 25.5 and a ranking of 84 out of 119
developing countries.35 Nigeria was also listed among countries with
imminent famine warnings due to drought, starvation, and escalated
violent conflict in the northern part of the country. In the North East, 4.5
million Nigerians are at the risk of famine while female-headed
households are more food insecure than others.36 In the section below
we discuss the political, economic, social, and environmental factors
affecting food availability, affordability and accessibility in Nigeria. We
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pay attention to how power structures, social and economic relations,
land rights, and ecological transformation will affect the country’s
potentials to achieve SDG 2.
4.1.1 Barriers to Food Security in Nigeria
4.1.1.1 Climate Change, Bad Harvests, and Dysfunctional Markets
Like most African countries, Nigeria relies heavily on rain-fed agriculture,
which is becoming more precarious due to climate change. In Southern
Nigeria, climate-related flooding destroys farms every year while drought
conditions compounded by the lack of irrigation affect food production
in the North.37 Desertification is also wiping out plants, animals and
freshwater resources, thus pushing people to further encroach on the
few parcels of forest left in the North.38 Furthermore, lower yields brought
about by the combination of high temperatures, less rainfall, and
shrinking lakes are a significant cause of poor harvest. Lower yields
mean less food for consumers and lower returns on farmers’ investments.
In other words, they are less able to afford setting up for next planting
season and are increasingly forced to abandon their farms to find work
in other sectors,39 thereby decreasing food production and availability.
4.1.2   Power Politics, Conflicts, and Food Accessibility
While droughts, arid conditions, and natural disasters can bring about
famine, politics and internal strife can exacerbate such conditions. In
Nigeria’s predominantly farming areas of the Middle Belt Region, violent
clashes between farmers and herdsmen have resulted in the destruction
of lives and farmlands, threatening food security.40 Climate change and
the expanding Sahara desert are reducing grazing land in Northern
Nigeria, forcing herdsmen further south where they come into conflict
with farmers and their land. Some states have tried to address this problem
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by passing anti-open grazing laws, but this has driven more herdsmen
into states without these laws, thus escalating conflicts in those areas.
Added dimensions to the land use struggle are religious and ethnic
tensions: the herders are predominantly Muslims and farmers Christians
from a different ethnicity group. The President Muhammadu Buhari
government has done very little to intervene in the conflicts. Some scholars
blame this on a conflict of interest since the president is from the same
ethnicity as the herders.41 Moreover, Boko Haram is suspected of playing
both sides against one another to stir up further unrest.42 Militant
activities in this area have slowed down the rate of production, thereby
creating food shortages and hurdles with accessibility – as fear prevents
people from going to their farms and keeping aid organizations from
reaching those in need of food (UNDP 2017). This problem is further
exploited by Boko Haram; the group uses food shortages as a recruitment
tool – promising disaffected, starving Nigerians food in exchange for
enlistment, creating a vicious cycle that will not be resolved on its own
without intervention from the Nigerian government.43
The crisis in Northern Nigeria impacts the whole nation. Urban areas
such as Lagos enjoyed relative food availability before the conflict became
full blown. The North supplies Lagos with 90 per cent of its food and
markets such as Ketu, Mile 12, and Oyingbo got their produce from
northern states daily before Boko Haram infiltrated the area,44 thereby
creating fear and destabilizing supply. These issues show how political
conundrums and conflicts in one part of the country could have
reverberating effects nationwide, thereby affecting overall food security.
4.1.3 Weak Regulatory Regime, Land Grabbing and
Sustainable Agriculture
Power politics can be seen in the minimal support provided to smallholder
farmers’ vis-à-vis big capital. On the one hand, farmers in Nigeria lack
supplies, including water, vehicles, tools, fuel, fertilizer, seeds, land,
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213-228.
47 Cerier S, “Led by Nigeria, Africa Opening Door To Genetically Modified Crop
Cultivation” (2017) <https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2017/03/06/led-
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training, education, and legal protection, which in turn affects their
ability to scale-up food production. On the other hand, the few lands
available to farmers are being threatened by the current wave of land
grabs going on across the country. Land grabbing is a large-scale
acquisition (buying or leasing) of land in developing countries by domestic
and transnational companies, government, and individuals for different
purposes, including biofuel production, food, financial security, and
ecotourism.45
This is often done with little regard for local communities’ rights to
land, food, livelihood, and environmental sustainability. Such land
appropriation has occurred in almost all 36 states of Nigeria – where the
federal government, represented by Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC) and their foreign partners, have acquired land to
produce agro-fuel despite being one of the leading producers of oil in the
world.46 Biotech companies producing GM crops have also increased
their presence and participation in land grabs in Nigeria with new research
into genetically modified forms of cassava, sorghum, cowpea and rice.47
This latter issue has implications for seed ownership and control. There
are also large-scale land deals for Jathropha, an agro-fuel, which could
dispossess smallholder farmers from their land, reduce investment in
food crops, and undermine sustainable agriculture.
4.1.4  Food Importation, Affordability, and Safety
Food prices have soared across Nigeria, but household income has not
kept pace.48 A basket of tomatoes that was sold for N300-N500 in 2004
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49 Eme et al (2014).
50 Ojo, E. O., and Adebayo, P. F., “Food Security in Nigeria: An Overview” (2012)
European Journal of Sustainable Development 1(2):199–222.
51 Onafeso, O. D., Akanni, C. O., & Badejo, B. A., “Climate Change Dynamics and
Imperatives for Food Security in Nigeria” (2015) Indonesian Journal of
Geography,  47(2), 151-159.
52 Qatar Economics, (2018) Retrieved on 15 December 2018, from <https://
tradingeconomics.com/qatar/employed-persons>
53 Sippel, S., & Kemmerling, B. “Power Geometries of Food Security: A Critical
Area Studies Perspective” (2013) In: Middell, M. Self-Reflexive Area Studies 215–
247.
became N7,000-N9,000 by 2014.49 The latter is not affordable to most
Nigerians who live on less than N1.088 per day. Several factors affect
food prices in Nigeria, including the lack of infrastructure, corruption,
conflict, fluctuation in oil prices, and transportation cost associated with
moving food from the North to the South. The Federal Government’s
response to food shortages and the consequent rise in prices has been to
increase food imports using oil revenue.50 Nigeria spends over a trillion
naira annually on food imports: N635 billion on wheat; N356 billion on
rice; N217 billion on sugar; and N97 billion on fish.51 This creates an
additional financial burden for the country while increasing vulnerability
to price volatility in the global market. Food importation also has safety
implications, especially when they come from countries with low safety
standards such as China. Due to high tariffs, many food imports, including
rice, are smuggled illegally through Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Benin,
without proper check for their safety. A number of people have died of
food poisoning in the recent years; food regulation and control are low.
For example, expiry dates are re-stamped to increase sales past actual
recommendation by producers.
The combined structural and socially induced problems discussed in
the section are, in part, responsible for food insecurity in Nigeria. The
SDG 2 offers a new opportunity to revisit these concerns and to re-appraise
Nigeria’s food security strategy.
4.2 Overview of Food Security in Qatar
Unlike Nigeria, Qatar is a relatively small country with a land mass of
11, 570 km2 and a population of 2.6 million people; made up of over 80
per cent immigrants.52 It is one of the richest in the world owing to its
oil reserves and its increasing economic diversification.53 Qatar’s Human
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Development Index (HDI) value for 2017 is 0.856 which puts the country
in the high human development category – positioning it at 37 out of
189 countries and territories.54 Qatar’s GDP is US$167.6 billion and its
GNI per capita on PPP is US$116,818.55 Unemployment is consistently
low, reported at a 0.10 per cent rate in 2018.56 Qatar attained MDG 1
around 1990 using the UN benchmark of US$1.25.57 However, the country
has one of the harshest climates on earth with 1.1 per cent arable land,
low soil fertility, and severe water scarcity.58 Also, it receives little rain
throughout the year – 71 mm per year on average – and its aquifers are
depleted.59 Despite these constraints, the country ranks high at 76.5
composite score on the Global Food Security Index: covering affordability,
availability, quality and safety.60 Behind these glossy figures is a heavy
reliance on food imports, which presents significant challenges to long-
term food security under the SDGs. We discuss the barriers Qatar faces
on food security in the section below; including some of the politically
contested solutions it is taking to address its food security problems.
4.2.1 Barriers to Food Security in Qatar
4.2.1.1 Climate Change, Import Dependency and Food Prices
Achieving food security has not always been easy for Qatar. Given its
arid climate and limited water supply, the country produces very little of
its own food. In fact, over the last decade, climate change has further
exacerbated these conditions by intensifying the cycle of water scarcity,
causing drier weather and consequent reduction in agricultural yields,
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forcing the country to near total dependence on the global food market.61
Technological fixes, such as irrigation and desalination, have been the
options open to Qatar to improve its local food production; however
desalination requires large capital inputs and leads to high food prices.
Food importation was, therefore, a cheaper and more feasible option.
Qatar imports about 90 per cent of its food from several countries.62 For
example, between 1998 and 2017, Qatar spent QAR 105.78 billion on
food imports comprising mainly of meats, cereals, dairy and vegetables.63
Although the food importation has been less of a financial burden,64 it
remains a political nightmare.65 Threats of trade embargos and
dependency on foreign imports produce a keen awareness of the country’s
fragility.66 This awareness heightened during the 2008 global food crisis
when prices escalated, and food supply was dramatically cut short as
countries imposed temporary export bans on food. During this period,
daily staples such as milk and cereal became unaffordable, especially for
low-income migrant workers.67 Qatar’s tenuous relationship with Saudi
Arabia and Iran made it difficult for the country to weather the socially-
induced food crisis, thus prompting a re-appraisal of the country’s food
security strategy.68
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4.2.2 Self-Sufficiency and Land Acquisitions
Following the 2008 food crisis, therefore, Qatar developed an interest in
achieving self-sufficiency. The government introduced the Qatar National
Food Security Programme (QNFSP) in 2009 with the aim of increasing
self-sufficiency from 10 per cent to 70 per cent by 2023. Ambitions were
lowered to 40 to 60 per cent in a later version of the plan. This programme,
finalized in 2013, set goals to increase independence, foreign investments,
and trade agreements to achieve greater food security.69 Within this
framework, Qatar also considered water security, energy consumption,
and international and public-private partnerships.70 Domestically, Qatar
seeks to update its food processing regulations and practices, thus
increasing the quality of food entering its market while decreasing food
waste.71 Furthermore, the QNFSP aims to produce its own food by
dramatically increasing its domestic production through hydroponics,
greenhouses, and desalinization.72 Such plans have been criticized as
hopeful at best, given the financial and ecological challenges to
agricultural production in the region.73 Water security is also a barrier –
as aquifer use is unsustainable while desalinization has significant
environmental, financial, and social costs.
As part of its food security strategy, Qatar continues to rely on imports
but has also increased its foreign agricultural investments.74 It invests in
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78 Lawrence et al (2013).
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10) Retrieved 21 December 2018, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/
06/qatar-gulf-rift-key-moments-ongoing-crisis-170610042600142.html.
farmland acquisitions and operations in foreign countries.75 This reduces
the reliance on the world market and is therefore less prone to price
fluctuations.76 Hassad Food Company (HFC), Qatar’s sovereign wealth
fund for foreign agro-investments, was established in 2008 to facilitate
land acquisition and increase food production and supply. HFC operates
farms in Qatar, Australia, Oman, Sudan, Pakistan, and is considering
expanding to Kenya, Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, and Ukraine. As of 2017,
HFC owns a quarter of a million hectares of agricultural land in Australia
where it produces sheep and wheat.77 Qatar wields significant wealth
and power that allows it meet its food security goals through land
acquisition abroad. However, this also raises questions about the impact
of such acquisitions on smallholder farmers in poor countries such as
Pakistan, Kenya, and Ethiopia; similar to the land grabbing trend in
Nigeria. There is also potential effect on local production and food
availability in those nations.78
4.2.3 Geopolitical Struggles and Food Disruption
Prior to the 2017 boycott, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) were Qatar’s important trade partners. About 40 per cent of Qatar’s
food imports enter through the border of Saudi Arabia. This puts Qatar
at the mercy of regional geopolitical struggles. In 2017, a Saudi Arabia-
led coalition, which included the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, among others,
severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed an air, sea, and
land blockade that prevented the importation of food and other goods.79
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Weathered the Gulf Crisis” (2018, June 11). Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from
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The dispute occurred due to Qatar’s alleged support for Islamist groups
such as the Muslim Brotherhood and others backed by Iran. This blockade
was both a challenge and opportunity for Qatar to again re-think its
food security strategies. First, it put a spotlight on the fragility of the
country’s food security, showing how reliance on foreign food can be
easily disrupted by political disputes.80 Second, it revealed that larger
financial investment will be needed to keep the economy afloat under
such disruption. For instance, Qatar spent over US$40 billion to prop up
its economy in the midst of the blockade.81 These experiences have forced
Qatar to become more independent, build stronger international
relationships with countries outside of the blockade, and plan for a
more sustainable future.82
4.2.4 Food Preference and Waste
Despite Qatar’s inability to produce its own food to meet local population
needs, the country’s high income and evolving import-substitution has
enabled it to achieve a relatively high level of food security. However,
food prices have doubled and even rose 10 times higher before the 2017
boycott. This poses a significant challenge to food access for immigrant
labourers helping to prepare Qatar for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. In
contrast, for most Qatari nationals the problem has been food preferences
not price.83 Qataris are used to a variety of foods imported from the
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global market and have developed specific tastes and quality preferences.84
For example, they dislike Turkish milk relative to Saudi milk.85 Such
peculiar taste and preference is connected to food waste, which has
been an increasing problem over the last decade.86 Politically, food
regulators encourage the disposal of food at earlier dates than necessary.87
Culturally, people prefer high quality and blemish-free food, rejecting
food for superficial reasons. People also fail to keep food at safe
temperatures, leading to early deterioration and spoilage.88 These aspects
of Qataris life has led to increasing food waste especially among the
wealthy.89
5. DISCUSSION AND REFORMS FOR PROGRESSIVE
REALIZATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
Nigeria and Qatar, while having similar oil-based economies and high
dependency on food imports, face significantly different political and
ecological struggles in their efforts to achieve food security and meet the
demands of SDG 2. As the demand for oil drops due to new innovations
aimed at addressing climate change, both countries may face new
economic crises that could inhibit their ability to pay for food imports.
This future threat means both countries have to seek for sustainable
ways to achieve food security while overcoming current barriers. To do
this, a variety of social, legal, technological, institutional, and political
reforms are required. We discuss some of these reforms in the section
below.
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5.1 Implementing Social and Institutional Reforms
Food security is vital to the economic and political stability of any country.
SDG 2 offers Nigeria and Qatar a fresh opportunity to create new
governance architectures to boost agricultural productivity and improve
food security strategies. It emphasizes the need to use a mix of market
incentives, agricultural financing, seed distribution programmes,
vulnerability assessment, institutional redesign and technological
innovations. In doing so, SDG 2 seeks to end hunger and ensure the
availability, accessibility and affordability of nutritious and sufficient
food for all people.90 In the case of Qatar, the government has already
taken measures to revitalize its national food programmes through
strategic shifts from trade-based food policy to increased support for self-
sufficiency. After the 2017 blockade, Qatar adopted two policy frameworks:
the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV 2030) and Qatar Second National
Development Strategy (2NDS).91 The 2NDS stresses self-reliance on a
variety of issues, ranging from food and medicine to national security.92
Within this framework, Qatar has a variety of plans in place to increase
food and water sustainability as well as accelerate local agricultural
innovation using soil-free greenhouse farming systems and recycled
irrigation water. Qatar also aims to grow up to 70 per cent of its own
vegetables by 2030.93 In addition to increasing national food production,
Qatar has opened new trade routes with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan thereby
diversifying its food import profile.94
In the case of Nigeria, the government has established a multi-layer
and multi-cluster institutional framework for enhanced coordination on
90 United Nations, “Sustainable Development Goals Report 2016” (2016) <https:/
/unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2016/> (accessed March 16, 2017).
91 Reuters, “Facing Boycott, Qatar Focuses on Self-Reliance in Five-Year Plan”
(2018 14 March) Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-
economy-plan-idUSKCN1GQ29S> ; See also Ministry of Development Planning
and Statistics, “Qatar Second National Development Strategy 2018-2022” (2018)
Gulf Publishing and Printing Company. Retrieved from www.mdps.gov.qa.
92 Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (2018).
93 Doha News, “Soil-Free Greenhouses to Help Qatar Grow Up to 70% Of Its Veg
by 2023” (2015, August 25) Retrieved from <https://dohanews.co/soil-free-
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94 Castelier, S., & Pouré, C., “Made in Qatar: How the Blockade Has Boosted Gulf
State’s Food Production” (2018, 9 October) Retrieved 20 December 2018, from
https://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/made-qatar-how-the-
blockade-has-boosted-Gulf%27s-state-s-food-production-1889951871
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SDGs mainstreaming. A Senior Special Assistant to the President (SSAP)
on SDGs and an Inter-Ministerial Committee have been established to
guide and coordinate engagement with government ministries,
departments, and agencies to ensure horizontal and vertical coherence
between SDGs and other development policies and strategies.95 There
are also several federal policies and programme drivers aimed at SDG 2.
These include the Green Alternative Promotion Policy; Incentive-Based-
Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending; Rural Finance Institution
Building Programmes; Commercial Agricultural Credit Scheme; and so
on. In addition, there are two civil society policy initiatives – the Zero
Hunger Programme and the Savings Internal Loan Schemes.96 While
these efforts are commendable, corruption, political instability, economic
recession, and lack of harmonization are major roadblocks to proper
implementation. Moving forward, Nigeria needs a clear strategic plan
on SDG 2, such as an Integrated National Food Security Strategy (IFSS)
and action plan. An IFSS can help a country identify the key nutritional
needs of its citizens and key actions to improve food security such as
reliable and inclusive data on food and agricultural programmes;
expansion of irrigation and land tenure security especially for women
and other small-scale farmers; adoption of procedural and rights-based
mechanisms to increase awareness and participation in food production
programmes; and removal of political barriers and policies that stifle
agriculture, distort food prices, and increase local vulnerabilities to hunger
and poverty.
5.2 Adapting Technological Innovation to Meet Local
Needs
Qatar’s technological advancement and investment in local infrastructure
has allowed the country to increase local food production despite having
limited arable land, less manpower, and severe climatic constraints. The
government also emphasizes the sustainable management of fisheries
and the development of aquaculture to meet national demand. Qatar
plans to develop alternative and efficient feedstocks to boost the livestock
industry. Regulation and financial support have also been put in place to
95 Federal Republic of Nigeria, “Implementation of the SDGs: A National Voluntary
Review” (2017) https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/
16029Nigeria.pdf.
96 Federal Republic of Nigeria (2017).
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improve the quality and quantity of livestock production. On water
security, Qatar hopes to improve the efficiency of agricultural and domestic
water use through social awareness programmes and modern technology
and regulations.97 Nationalist sentiments toward local food consumption
and purchasing have also emerged since the 2017 blockade. Many people
now buy food made in Qatar, thus increasing the profitability and viability
of local industries. Early endeavours into hydroponics to expand local
food production have been promising and the government remains
committed to these technological and policy fixes.98
Nigeria, incongruously, has large tracts of arable land and significant
manpower but limited infrastructure and modern technology to increase
agricultural production and yields. If SDG 2 is to be met by 2030, Nigeria
will need substantial increases in agricultural investments and
infrastructure, including extensions, credit, improved road, and
transportation systems. Farmers also need more support from public and
private institutions to meet the demand for irrigation technology, training,
education, supply tools, seeds, fertilizers, storage facilities, tax subsidies,
and other solutions that address local food challenges.99
5.3 Reforming Property Laws and Protecting Land Rights
Qatar has strong laws that protect property and ownership of land. The
Qatar Law No. (14) of 1964 establishes the property system and land
title in Qatar, while Law No. (13) of 1988 allows the government to
expropriate land for public use. However, this is not a common practice
and when it happens, owners receive fair compensation in return. In the
case of Nigeria, the Land Use Act of 1978 vests absolute ownership,
management, and control of land in each state of the federation of Nigeria
in the Governor, leaving individuals with “rights of occupancy”.100
97 Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, “Qatar Second National
Development Strategy 2018-2022” (2018) Gulf Publishing and Printing Company.
Retrieved from <www.mdps.gov.qa>
98 Mustafa, S.A.-A., “Growing food pyramids in the sand: how sustainable are
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Uche, O. A., & Uche, I. B., “Food insecurity in Nigeria: A Thematic Exposition”
(2014) Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (OMAN
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Furthermore, the Act allows for appropriation of land for public purposes.
This provision is frequently exploited by the government and has allowed
for the arbitrary confiscation of communal and tribal lands and the
acceleration of land grabs in the country, thus posing a major threat to
subsistence farmers. For example, indigenous groups and female farmers
face significant legal hurdles to maintaining their rights vis-a-vis state
policies and development processes that hand over land to big businesses.
Land grabbing robs people of their access to land and water and
undermines their livelihoods and food security.101 To progressively achieve
SDG 2, Nigeria will need to reform current land laws and also adopt new
legislative framework and policies that protect the rights of subsistence
farmers, especially women farmers, from land dispossession.
5.4 Improving Local and Geopolitical Conflict
Resolution Mechanisms
Concerns about food security in both Nigeria and Qatar heightened with
the sudden outbreak of conflicts. Internal conflicts involving Fulani-
herders as well as the Boko Haram insurgence in northern Nigeria affected
food production, availability, and prices across the country. Reduced
food access also compounded other forms of grievance and discontent,
such as poverty, unemployment, and marginalization. Similarly, when
fifteen countries led by Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic ties with Qatar,
the effect of this on food availability and price was swift and dramatic.
So, as Nigeria and Qatar look into the future to realize the SDGs, it will
be important to address such conflict-induced food insecurity. Measures
that can be taken include improving conflict resolution mechanisms at
different political scales; promoting peacebuilding programmes among
communities, groups and countries; de-politicizing food structures;
combining efforts to ensure resilient livelihoods; investing in agriculture
to prevent the cycle of conflict; and working to achieve sustained peace.
6.  CONCLUSION
This article has presented a holistic analysis of food security and
sustainable agricultural goals (SDG 2) within a broader political economy
101 Attah, N. E., “Possession by Dispossession: Interrogating the New Wave of
Land Grabbing in Nigeria” (2013) Journal of Land and Rural Studies,  1(2),
213-228.
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and political ecology context focusing on Nigeria and Qatar as case
studies. It discussed some of the multi-scale factors that undermined
MDG 1 and showed how global restructuring of seed ownership, unequal
trade, conflict, weak property regimes, and commodity market price
volatility all made the achievement of zero-hunger an unrealized goal in
many developing countries. Drawing on the Nigeria and Qatar case
studies, we argue that SDG 2 offers developing countries a fresh
opportunity to reassess and revitalize the national architecture on
sustainable agriculture as well as address existing political, ecological,
technological, social and geopolitical barriers that undermine food
security. At the national level, Qatar will need to continue to improve on
technological solutions, reduce food waste, expand trade relations and
agricultural investments, and support regional efforts on conflict
resolution. In the case of Nigeria, renewed efforts are required to address
the inadequate protection of smallholder farmers, confiscation of land,
technological gaps, internal conflicts, food safety and the lack of
institutional coordination on agricultural and food problems. Options
that could help include establishing IFSS and national laws that protect
people’s right to food, including the rights of subsistence farmers,
particularly women and indigenous people.
There is also a need to establish legal and social frameworks that
enhance harmonization and coordination among different agencies,
ministries and departments charged with food and agricultural
responsibilities. Governments will also need to mobilize necessary private
sector financing and capacity to boost investment in the agricultural
sector. Public-private partnership programmes on agriculture can promote
direct private sector investment in agricultural programmes as well as
rural microfinance schemes that could facilitate small-scale farmers’ access
to credit. Finally, transformation is required from local to global scales,
and this will include creating new models of governance that address
the linkages between food security, agriculture, water, and other
development matrices that are critical to the realization of SDG 2.
